Wiretapping--A History of Federal Legislation and Supreme Court Decisions by Gasque, Aubrey
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 15 Issue 3 Article 2 
1963 
Wiretapping--A History of Federal Legislation and Supreme Court 
Decisions 
Aubrey Gasque 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gasque, Aubrey (1963) "Wiretapping--A History of Federal Legislation and Supreme Court Decisions," 
South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 15 : Iss. 3 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol15/iss3/2 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
WIRETAPPING*
A HISTORY OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION
AND SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
AUBREY GASQUE**
ORIGIN OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION AND SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS
A war-time measure enacted in 1918, at a time when the
Federal Government was operating the nation's telephone sys-
tem, was the first federal legislation concerning wiretapping.
Fearful that indiscriminate wiretapping during this period
would jeopardize vital government secrets and facilitate es-
pionage activities, Congress provided that "whoever... shall,
without authority and without the knowledge and consent of
the other users.., tap any telegraph or telephone line" would
thereby commit a federal crime.1 This absolute prohibition
was only effective for the duration of World War I, since the
statute, by its own terms, expired when the Government re-
linquished control of the telephone system in July of 1919.2
The immediate post-war era reflected an increase in wire-
tapping, including its use by the Department of Justice. In
1924, however, Attorney General Stone banned wiretapping
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and labelled it "un-
ethical tactics." 3 Thus, when Olmstead v. United States4
was decided in 1928, wiretapping was not sanctioned by the
Department of Justice as a permissible method of investiga-
tion, but it was not thought to be an illegal practice.5
*Reprinted with the permission of the International Academy of Trial
Lawyers.
**Of Marion County. Member of the Marion County and South Caro-
lina Bar and the Supreme Court of the United States; formerly Assistant
Director, United States Courts; General Counsel, Subcommittee on Im-
provements in the Federal Criminal Code, United States Senate; Execu-
tive Secertary, Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedure and the
Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules of the Judicial Conference of the
United States.
1. Act of October 29, ch. 197, §1, 40 Stat. 1017-1018 (1918).
2. Act of July 11, ch. 10, §1, 41 Stat. 157 (1919).
3. See Hearings before Senate Select Committee on investigation of
the Attorney General pursuant to S. Res. 157, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., vol.
III, pp. 2489-2490; Statement of Attorney General Jackson, N. Y. Times,
March 18, 1940, p. 1, col. 3.
4. 277 U.S. 438, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1927).
5. A statement attributed to Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the
FBI, by Senator Wayne Morse (100 CONG. REC. 8048) may be regarded
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The Olmstead Decision
Olmstead v. United States, supra, involved a conviction for
conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act. As part of
its case in chief the Government had introduced wiretap evi-
dence. In affirming the convictions by a vote of 5-4, the Court
resolved the constitutional issue raised by restricting the ap-
plication of the Fourth Amendment to "tangible material
effects" and "actual physical invasion[s]," and concluded:
The reasonable view is that one who installs in his
house a telephone instrument with connecting wires in-
tends to project his voice to those quite outside, and that
the wires beyond his house and messages while passing
over them are not within the protection of the Fourth
Amendment.0
Although not within the scope of the grant of ceritiorari, the
Court also held that the rule of exclusion, as to evidence ob-
tained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, did not apply
to evidence obtained by wiretapping, even though the law of
the state involved prohibited this practice.7
Vigorous dissents were delivered by Justice Holmes, Bran-
deis, Butler and Stone. While "not prepared to say that the
penumbra of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments covers the
defendant," Mr. Justice Holmes believed that "the Govern-
ment ought not to use evidence obtained and only obtainable
by a criminal act." He closed by characterizing the wiretap-
ping situation disclosed by the record as a "dirty business."S
Mr. Justice Brandeis, on the other hand, did grapple with the
constitutional issue and his dissent putting wiretapping within
the orbit of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments became the
starting point of all legal argument against legislation per-
mitting wiretapping. "When the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments were adopted," argued Mr. Justice Brandeis, "'the
as a reliable statement of this position. The statement actually made in
1929 after the Olmstead decision, was before any change in departmental
policy: "We have a very definite rule in the Bureau that any employee
engaged in wiretapping will be dismissed from the service of the Bureau.
While it may not be illegal, I think it is unethical, and it is not permitted
under the regulations of the Attorney General."
This quotation appears to have been taken from Hearings before the
House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, 71st
Cong., 3rd Sess., p. 26.
6. 277 U.S. 438, 466; 72 L.Ed. 944, 951 (1927).
7. Id. at 466-469; 72 L.Ed. 944, 951-952.
8. Id. at 469-470; 72 L.Ed. 944, 952-953.
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form that evil had theretofore taken' had been necessarily
simple." Now, however, "subtler and more far-reaching means
of invading privacy [than were imagined by the Founding
Fathers] have become available to the Government. Discovery
and invention have made it possible for the Government ...
to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in the
closet." Reasoning that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
were intended to forbid any unwarranted intrusion into in-
dividual privacy, he concluded that the Fourth Amendment
forbids interception of telephone communications, while the
Fifth Amendment forbids the use as evidence of information
learned as the result of the interception.9
While the immediate effect of the Olmstead decision was to
establish that wiretapping was neither unconstitutional nor
a federal crime, and that the evidence procured thereby was
admissible in federal courts regardless of any state prohibi-
tion, it stimulated the introduction of legislation in both
Houses of Congress to make wiretap evidence inadmissible
in federal courts."0 These legislative proposals, however, were
uniformly unsuccessful.
It is also fair to suppose that the OlmsteaZ holding was a
factor in Attorney General Mitchell's decision, in 1931, to let
it be known that the Department would countenance wire-
tapping in criminal cases of "extreme importance" when au-
thority to tap was requested by the director of the bureau
concerned. Interception of telephone messages was not to be
allowed "in minor cases nor on Members of Congress, or any
citizen except where charge of a grave crime had been lodged
against him.""u Meanwhile, many government officials ap-
peared before Congress to voice opposition to the practice of
wiretapping and to assure the members that, other than as
indicated above, they were not utilizing wiretapping in their
work. 12
In 1932, further legislation was introduced in Congress,
forbidding wiretapping by federal employees and prohibiting
9. Id. at 473, 478-479; 72 L.Ed. 944, 954, 956-957.
10. H. R. 5416, 71st Cong., 1st Sess.; S. 6061, S. 3344, 71st Cong., 3rd
Sess.; see 71 CONG. REC. 5968.
11. Statement of Attorney General Jackson, supra note 3.
12. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Ap-
propriations on the Department of Justice Appropriation Bills, 72nd Cong.,
3rd Sess., pp. 65-73; id., 72d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 33, 72-73; id., 72d Cong.,
1st Sess., pp. 42, 251.
3
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the introduction of any wiretap evidence in federal courts.1 3
Although this legislation failed to pass, the general attitude of
Congress, clearly demonstrated during this period, finally cul-
minated in the second piece of federal legislation on this sub-
ject, enacted in 1933. Attached as a rider to an appropriation
bill, there appeared the following language: "No part of this
appropriation shall be used for or in connection with 'wire-
tapping' to procure evidence of violations of the National
Prohibition Act."'14
Enactment of Section 605 Federal Communications Act
At the same time a joint committee of Congress was busily
engaged in preparing legislation to transfer jurisdiction over
all radio, telegraph and telephone facilities to the newly
created Federal Communications Commission. An amendment
to the Radio Act of 1927 was prepared, and in 1934 the bill
as proposed passed Congress with few changes. 15 Included,
and hardly considered a worthy subject of debate at the time
of passage, was a relatively minor section, section 605, dealing
with the interception and divulgence of messages. This sec-
tion, with pertinent language underlined, follows:
§605. Unauthorized publication or use of communications.
No person receiving or assisting in receiving, or trans-
mitting, or assisting in transmitting, any interstate or
foreign communication by wire or radio shall divulge or
publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect,
or meaning, thereof, except through authorized channels
of transmission or reception, to any person other than
the addressee, his agent, or attorney, or to a person em-
ployed or authorized to forward such communication to
its distination, or to proper accounting or distributing
officers of the various communicating centers over which
the communication may be passed, or to the master of a
ship under whom he is serving, or in response to a
subpoena issued by a court of competent jurisdiction,
or on demand of other lawful authority; and no person
not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any
13. H. R. 9893, H. R. 5305, H. R. 23, 72d Cong., 1st Sess.; S. 1396,
73d Cong., 1st Sess.; see 74 CONG. REC. 3928, 75 CONG. REc. 4541.
14. Act of March 1, ch. 144, 47 Stat. 1371, 1381 (1933).
15. Federal Communications Act, 48 Stat. 1064, 1103, 47 U.S.C. 605
(1934).
[Vol. 15
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communication and divulge or publish the existence, con-
tents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such in-
tercepted communication to any person; and no person
not being entitled thereto shall receive or assist in re-
ceiving any interstate or foreign communication by wire
or radio and use the same or any information therein
contained for his own benefit or for the benefit of another
not entitled thereto; and no person having received such
intercepted communication or having become acquainted
with the contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning
of the same or any part thereof, knowing that such in-
formation was so obtained, shall divulge or publish the
existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning
of the same or any part thereof, or use the same or any
information therein contained for his own benefit or for
the benefit of another not entitled thereto; Provided,
That this section shall not apply to the receiving, divulg-
ing, publishing, or utilizing the contents of any radio
communication broadcast, or transmitted by amateurs or
others for the use of the general public, or relating to
ships in distress.
16
The Nardone Decision
Any notion that section G05 was innocuous or inconsequen-
tial was dissipated in 1937 when the case of Nardone v. United
States17 was decided by the Supreme Court. The Nardone
case involved several defendants who had been convicted of
liquor violations and a vital part of the proof rested upon
telephone conversations intercepted by federal agents. The
Court scrutinized the following operative language of sec-
tion 605, supra: ". . . No person not being authorized by the
sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or pub-
lish the . . . meaning of such intercepted communication to
any person." Reversing the convictions and remanding the
case for retrial, the Court held that a prohibition of the use
of wiretap evidence in federal courts was clearly within the
language of the statute, and the phrase "no person" included
federal agents. The net result was that federal agents were
precluded from testifying in federal courts to the contents
of intercepted messages since section 605 barred divulgence
16. Act of June 19, ch 652, §605, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934).
17. 302 U.S. 379, 82 L.Ed. 314 (1937).
5
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of intercepted communications to "any person." "To recite
the contents of the message in testimony before a court is to
divulge the message."' 8
The decision was criticized in many quarters as being an
example of judicial legislation and some said that the Court
had read more into the statute than the bare expression of
congressional intent had indicated.'1 That the Court was aware
that this contention might be forthcoming may be inferred
from its statement in the opinion that "It is also true that the
committee reports in connection with the Federal Communica-
tions Act dwell upon the fact that the major purpose of the
legislation was the transfer of jurisdiction over wire and
radio communications to the newly constituted Federal Com-
munications Commission. 2 0 The Court disposed of this argu-
ment by concluding that "these circumstances are, in our
opinion, insufficient to overbear the plain mandate of the
statute."
2 '
Second Nardone Decision
Upon retrial, the Nardone defendants were again convicted
and the case reached the Supreme Court in what is commonly
referred to as the second Nardone case.2 2 At the second trial,
intercepted communications were not used as evidence, but
defense counsel were denied the right to question prosecution
witnesses about the use which the police had made of the wire-
taps. The Supreme Court, upon reexamination of section 605
of the Federal Communications Act, decided that not only
were the contents of intercepted messages inadmissible as evi-
dence in federal courts, but the statutory prohibition extended
to any evidence based upon knowledge and information gained
or derived from intercepted messages. The Court stated its
position in these words:
[T]o reduce the scope of section 605 to exclusion of
the exact words heard through forbidden interceptions,
allowing these interceptions every derivative use that they
may serve . . .would largely stultify the policy which
compelled our decision in Nardone v. United States.
23
18. Id. at 382; 82 L.Ed. 314, 316.
19. At the time the amendment to the Radio Act was up for passage
in the Congress the managers of the bill assured that "the bill on the
whole does not change existing law." See 78 CONG. REC. 10313.
20. 302 U.S. 379, 382-383, 82 L.Ed. 314, 316-317 (1937).
21. Id.
22. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1934).
23. Id. at 340; 84 L.Ed. 307, 311.
[Vol. 15
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Weiss v. United States
This phase of judicial interpretation of the scope of section
605 was completed when the Supreme Court rendered its
decision in Weiss v. United States.24 The issue presented to
the Court in the Weiss case was whether section 605, in the
light of the Nardone decisions, applied to intrastate telephone
messages. Basing its view squarely upon the constitutional
principle that Congress may regulate intrastate transactions
when necessary to protect interstate commerce, the Court
concluded that the interdiction found in the second clause
of section 605 was not limited solely to interstate and foreign
communications.
25
In view of the decisions in both Nardone cases and in the
Weiss case, it seemed apparent that Mr. Justice Brandeis'
dissent in the Olmstead case had had a marked influence upon
the Court's course of decision. While Olmstead remained the
law on the constitutional issues involved in wiretapping, the
Court had construed section 605 as extending a remedy
normally reserved for invasions of Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ment rights to certain instrusions by federal officers into
another kind of privacy. The privacy of telephone communica-
tions, although not protected by the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments, was held to be protected by statute from invasion by
federal officers, in much the same way as this privacy would
have been protected if these amendments did apply. By force
of law, evidence obtained, directly or indirectly, by federal
officers through interception of telephone communications
was excluded just as surely and just as completely as would
have been the case if the remedy had been found in the
Constitution.
Changing Congressional Attitude
Although the judicial view regarding wiretapping was, in
1938-1939, one of prohibition, the attitude of Congress was
changing course. Shortly after the first Nardone case, a bill
was introduced to avoid the effect of that decision. Surpris-
ingly enough, that bill came closer to enactment than any
subsequent measure introduced in Congress. Versions of it
were approved by both Houses of Congress and the unparal-
24. 308 U.S. 321, 84 L.Ed. 398 (1939).
25. Id. at 329; 84 L.Ed. 398, 302-303.
1963]
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leled success of this measure is even more striking when con-
sideration is given to its broad features. It provided that the
head of any executive department or agency could authorize
wiretapping if he had reason to believe that a felony against
the United States was about to be committed, the prevention
of which was within his jurisdiction. This bill died in Con-
gress because minor differences between the House and Senate
versions could not be resolved before adjournment. 26
In March, 1940, Attorney General Jackson apparently con-
cluded that he could no longer ignore the two Nardone de-
cisions and the holding in Weiss v. United States. In an-
nouncing a return to the 1924 policy forbidding wiretapping
by the FBI, Jackson stated that "under the existing state of
the law and decisions," wiretapping "cannot be done unless
Congress sees fit to modify the existing statutes." 27 In taking-
such action, however, the Attorney General underestimated
the determination of those who believed that, because of in-
creased international tensions, authority to intercept at least
some communications was essential to national survival. A
House Joint Resolution was approved giving the Federal
Bureau of Investigation authority to wiretap in certain sit-
uations relating to national security.28 While this measure
failed to win Senate approval, Attorney General Jackson, early
in 1941, was forced to reverse his position. In a change of
policy commonly attributed to intervention by President
Roosevelt,29 Jackson announced that he had given the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation authority to intercept communi-
cations during the course of certain investigations. To justify
such a shift in policy, however, it was believed necessary to
attempt to reconcile governmental wiretapping with the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of section 605. In a letter to the,
House Judiciary Committee dated March 19, 1941, urging
26. S. 3756, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1938). The variation in the bill as,
it passed each House resulted when the House of Representatives added
to the Senate version a paragraph prescribing a penalty for unauthorized
tapping or divulgence by federal employees. 83 CONG. REC. 7054, ef. 8a.
CONG. REc. 9452-9453, 9636-9637.
27. Statement of Attorney General Jackson, supra note 3.
28. H. R. J. Res. 553, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess.
29. Testimony of Attorney General Brownell, Hearings Before a Sub-_
committee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess.,
on S. 832, S. 2753, S. 3229, and H.R. 8649, p. 16; Rogers, The Case for Wire-
tapping, 63 YALE L. J. 792, 795; Statement by J. Edgar Hoover, 58 YALE,
L. J. 422-423; Statement of Congressman Yates of Illinois on April 7,.
1954, 100 CONG. Rc. 4797; DASH, ScHwARTz & KNOWLTON, THE EAVES-
DROPPERS (1960), p. 32. Compare, however, Donnelly, Comments and'
Cavcats On The Wire Tapping Controversy, 63 YALE L. J. 799, 800, fn. 7..
[Vol. 15
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the adoption of pending wiretapping legislation, the Attorney
General offered the following rationale:
There is no Federal statute that prohibits or punishes
wiretapping alone. The only offense under the present
law is to intercept any communication and divulge or
publish the same. Any person, with no risk of penalty,
may tap telephone wires and eavesdrop on his competitor,
employer, workman, or others, and act upon what he
hears or make any use of it that does not involve di-
vulgence or publication.
To use evidence obtained by wiretapping for the pro-
tection of society against criminals often requires that
it be divulged in open court. It is this divulging in law
enforcement that court decisions hold to violate the
statute .... 30
The statutory measures introduced in 1941 and 1942 to
authorize wiretapping in the interests of national security
were not passed by the Congress.31 In 1942, House Joint Reso-
lution 310,32 to authorize the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and the intelligence units of the armed services to wiretap in
investigations of suspected sabotage, treason, seditious con-
spiracy, espionage and violations of the neutrality laws, passed
the House but died in the Senate.
With the congressional attitude tending to favor limited
wiretap authority under proper safeguards, the Supreme
Court decided two more cases involving alleged violations
under section 605 as embodying the essence of the constitu-
tional right of privacy, so it now added a limitation appro-
priate to that right. The Court also clarified the meaning
of the word, "interception."
Third Persons Not Protected
In 1942 the case of Goldstein v. United States33 determined
the status of a third person to object to the use of wiretap
evidence to persuade his co-conspirators to testify against
him. Nothing that a person not the victim of an unlawful
30. 87 CONG. REC. 5764.
31. H. R. 4228, H. R. 3099, and H. R. 2266, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R.
6919, H. R. J. Res. 273, H. R. J. Res. 304, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.
32. 77th Congress, 2d Sess., 88 CONG. REC. 4594-4597.
33. 316 U.S. 114, 86 L.Ed. 1312 (1941).
1963]
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search and seizure has no right to object to the introduction
of evidence seized thereunder, 34 the Court concluded that third
parties lacked standing to object to the admissibility of evi-
dence thus indirectly obtained by wiretapping. "[E]ven though
the use made of the communications ... to induce the parties
to them to testify were held a violation of the statute, this
would not render the testimony so procured inadmissible
against a person not a party to the message.
35
"Interception" Defined
In the case of Goldman v. United States,36 which involved
a conspiracy to violate the Bankruptcy Act, the Court defined
the word "interception," as used in section 605 of the Federal
Communications Act. In Goldman, federal agents were able
to record a defendant's telephone conversations by the use of
a detectophone, a sensitive electrical listening device placed
against the wall of an adjoining room. The Court concluded
that section 605 was not applicable because eavesdropping
upon one end of a telephone conversation is not an intercep-
tion of that communication, holding:
What is protected is the message itself throughout its
transmission by the instrumentality or agency of trans-
mission.... Words spoken in a room in the presence of
another into a telephone receiver do not constitute a
communication by wire within the meaning of the sec-
tion .... [Interception] indicates the taking or seizure
by the way or before arrival at the destined place. It
does not ordinarily connote the obtaining of what is to be
sent before, or at the moment, it leaves the possession of
the proposed sender, or after, or at the moment, it comes
into possession of the intended receiver.37
Interception Alone Is Not a Crime
A sort of uneasy truce between the friends and foes of
wire-tapping prevailed for the duration of World War II and
34. FED. R. CRIm. P. 41(e) embodies the principle that "a party will
not be heard to claim a constitutional protection unless he 'belongs to the
class for whose sake the constitutional protection is given.'" Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261-264, 4 L.Ed.2d 687, 701-704 (1960); see
Raines v. United States, 362 U.S. 17, 22, 4 L.Ed.2d 524, 530 (1960). Cf.
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 459-460, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488, 1497-1498
(1958).
35. 316 U.S. 114, 122, 86 L.Ed. 1312, 1318 (1941).
36. 316 U.S. 129, 86 L.Ed. 1322 (1941).
37. Id. at 133-134; 86 L.Ed. 1322, 1326-1327.
[Vol. 15
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the early years of the cold war. It was a federal offense to
intercept and divulge both interstate and intrastate telephone
communications, and evidence so obtained by federal officers
- or obtained as the fruit of such activities - was not ad-
missible in federal trials. On the other hand, it was not an
offense to eavesdrop, even when the investigator used a
scientific device to enhance his natural faculties, for only
the means of communication itself was within the ambit of
protection. Standing as the person aggrieved was a prereq-
uisite to the assertion of any complaint. Furthermore, the
Department of Justice continued to adhere to the position
formulated in 1941 - that the prohibition spelled out in
section 605 applied only where there was an interception and
a subsequent divulgence of the communication.
This interpretation of section 605, which has been called
"strained and overtechnical,"38 essentially reduces to two
propositions. First, since the section uses the terms "intercept
• . . and divulge or publish," both events must occur before
there is a violation. Second, the entire Department of Justice is
an entity. Therefore, an investigator does not "divulge or
publish" when he passes wiretap information on to his asso-
ciates and superiors inside the Government. Thus, Attorney
General Biddle found it possible to state that to prohibit
divulgence was not to prohibit an investigator from reporting
to his superiors.3 9 The logic of the theoretical justification
for this administrative policy is outside the scope of this
paper. For present purposes, it is enough to note that those
who advocated wiretapping seemed to believe that they could
live with the then existing situation.
The state of tacit cease-fire ended as the nation entered
the new decade in 1950. Among the reasons for renewed
interest in this field was the fact that wiretapping by private
individuals in the District of Columbia became the subject of
congressional scrutiny. An investigation revealed that a local
police official had wiretapped as a private venture. At one
point, this officer apparently was employed by a Senator to
tap the telephones of private attorneys; on another occasion
he intercepted the telephone messages of another Senator.40
Another significant development occurred when Judith Cop-
Ion became the subject of criminal prosecution.
38. S. REP. No. 2700, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 5.
39. N. Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1941, p. 4, col. 2; see 100 CoNG. REC. 8052
40. Supra note 38, at 2-4.
19631
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The Coplon Cases
As a result of an intensive investigation, Judith Coplon, a
former employee of the Justice Department, was indicted
separately in two cases, one arising in the Southern District
of New York, and the other in the District of Columbia, each
charging her with conspiracy to defraud the United States
and attempting to deliver defense information to a foreign
agent. At her trial on the New York indictment, it was shown
by defense counsel that agents of the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation had intercepted many of Miss Coplon's telephone
communications. District Judge Ryan, commenting on the
scope of the prohibition in section 605, noted:
This is still the law; it has not been repealed or modi-
fied, it contains no exemptions .... The fact these in-
terceptions were carried on under written authorization
of the Attorney General imparts no sanctity to them; they
remain unlawful and prohibited.
41
Relying in part upon records which the trial court withheld
from the defendant on grounds of national security, he held,
however, that the interceptions had in no way furnished the
leads to the evidence which was introduced at trial. Miss
Coplon's conviction followed as a matter of course.
The court of appeals reversed, holding, inter alia, that the
trial judge erred in denying to the defense the opportunity
to inspect all of the wiretap records relied upon by Judge
Ryan in concluding that wiretapping had not tainted the evi-
dence introduced at trial. The appellate court reasoned that
the prosecution was obliged "to convince the trial court that
its proof had an independent origin '4 2 once it was shown that
wiretapping had occurred. The prosecution failed to carry
this burden by failing to reveal, for the record, the nature of
all of the intercepted communications. In other words, the
prosecution had to choose between full disclosure and failure
of the prosecution. The court of appeals also held that the
lower court had unduly restricted defense counsel's inquiry
into the question of whether the information which initiated
the investigation was procured by wiretapping. In disposing
of the case the court of appeals, in an opinion by Judge
41. United States v. Coplon, 88 F.Supp. 921, 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
42. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341, 84 L.Ed. 307, 312
(1939).
604 [Vol. 15
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Learned Hand, posed the problem which confronts those who
oppose all forms of wiretapping: "For all the foregoing rea-
sons, the conviction must be reversed; but we will not dismiss
the indictment for the guilt [of espionage] is plain .... ,43
The final chapter in the Coplon matter took place in the
District of Columbia. Brought to trial on the second indict-
ment against her, Miss Coplon was convicted and the con-
viction was affirmed. She subsequently moved for a new trial
on the grounds of newly discovered evidence relating to wire-
tapping. The trial court denied this motion, but was reversed
by the court of appeals. 44
The New York indictment against Judith Coplon has not
been dismissed but the possibility of retrial seems remote at
the present time. So far as the District of Columbia indict-
ment is concerned, her motion for a new trial is still pending
a hearing on the allegations raised in that motion. Tech-
nically, the defendant is free on $60,000 bail.45
On Lee v. United States
Consideration must be given to On Lee46 and Schwartz v.
Texas, 47 both of which were decided in 1952, before returning
to the story of developments in the Congress. We shall also
deal with Irvine v. California.4
If the other cases which have been discussed are important
to an understanding of what is wiretapping, then the On Lee
case and Goldman, supra, help to explain what it is not. In
On Lee, a federal agent engaged the defendant in conversa-
tion, during the course of which the defendant made incrim-
inatory statements. Unknown to the defendant, the agent had
a small radio transmitter concealed on his person, and the
defendant's admissions were thus communicated to another
federal agent stationed nearby with a radio receiver. The
Supreme Court did not find it difficult to conclude that these
facts did not show a violation of section 605:
43. United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 640 (2d Cir. 1950), cert.
denied 342 U.S. 920, 96 L.Ed. 688 (1951).
44. United States v. Coplon, 91 F. Supp. 867 (D.D.C. 1950), rev'd 191
F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied 342 U.S. 926, 96 L.Ed. 690 (1951).
45. Washington Evening Star, April 7, 1961, p. A-2, col. 1.
46. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 96 L.Ed. 1270 (1951).
47. 344 U.S. 199, 97 L.Ed. 231 (1952).
48. 347 U.S. 128, 98 L.Ed. 561 (1953).
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Petitioner had no wires and no wireless. There was
no interference with any communications facility which
he possessed or was entitled to use. He was not sending
messages to anybody or using a system of communications
within the Act.
40
Schwartz v. Texas
Considerations of federalism were important in Schwartz
v. Texas.50 In that case, local police used a wiretap to listen
in on telephone calls between the defendant and one Jarrett.
Records of these telephone conversations were admitted in evi-
dence against defendant during his trial in the state court,
although defense counsel made timely objection. The ques-
tion before the United States Supreme Court was "whether
these communications are barred . . .from use as evidence
in a criminal proceeding in a state court." 51
Passing the question of the power of Congress to regulate
the use of wiretap evidence in state courts, the Court refused
to find an attempt to exercise any such power in section 605.
The exercise of such a power even where constitutionally per-
missible "is not lightly to be presumed, ' 52 and no pattern of
regulation having been expressed in section 605, it followed
that Congress had made no attempt to require the States to
impose the sanction of exclusion when it enacted the statute.
"Where a state has carefully legislated so as not to render
inadmissible evidence obtained and sought to be divulged in
violation of the laws of the United States, this Court will not
extend by implication the statute of the United States so as
to invalidate the specific language of the state statute.1
53
The holding in Schwartz is not only important in its own
right, it is also an illustration of the danger of attempting to
push too far any analogy between cases involving the Fourth
Amendment and cases involving wiretapping. Certain com-
mentators 54 raised theoretical objections to the Court's posi-
tion in Schwartz, since by hypothesis, there is a fresh divul-
gence within the very presence of the state court, and the
49. 343 U.S. 747, 354, 96 L.Ed. 1270, 1275 (1951).
50. 344 U.S. 199, 97 L.Ed. 231 (1952).
51. Id. at 201; 97 L.Ed. 231, 234.
52. Id. at 203; 97 L.Ed. 231, 235.
53. Id. at 202; 97 L.Ed. 231, 235.
54. See, for example, Bradley and Hogan, Wiretapping: From Nardone
to Benanti and Rathbun, 46 Gao. L. J. 429.
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commission (if not the repetition) of a federal crime at that
time. The Schwartz situation, so it was argued, is thus easily
distinguishable from the Fourth Amendment problem re-
solved in identical fashion in Wolf v. Colorado,55 where it
was held "that in a prosecution in a State court for a State
crime the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the ad-
mission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and
seizure." 56 Moreover, the holding in Wolf was expressly
reversed during the October, 1960, term, in Mapp v. Ohio. "
"We hold," said the Court in Mapp, "that all evidence obtained
by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is,
by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court."58 In
detail, then, it is contended that if the privacy protected by
section 605 is analogous to the individual right to be protected
against unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth
Amendment, then the ban against the use in state tribunals
of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search or seizure
should be regarded as a precedent for the imposition of a
similar ban against the use in state courts of evidence obtained
in violation of section 605. Alternatively, if the remedy ap-
plied when an unreasonable search and seizure has occurred
is not regarded as strictly applicable to state cases involving
interception and divulgence of telephone communications, then
the latter problem should be regarded as the more deserving
of an extreme remedy, since the offense against federal law
is committed or repeated in the state court itself.
This line of reasoning ignores an essential difference be-
tween Fourth Amendment and wiretapping situations. In
the case of unreasonable searches and seizures the Supreme
Court has held that the Fourth Amendment, in and of itself,
requires State courts to apply the remedy of exclusion.50 The
protection against interception and divulgence of telephone
communications, however, is purely statutory. Congress need
not - and the Supreme Court held in Schwrtz that it did
not - require the states to apply the remedy of exclusion in
state prosecutions. While the Supreme Court has the authority
to enforce a remedy of exclusion in the lower federal courts,
it does not have a similar general supervisory authority over
55. 338 U.S. 25, 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1948).
56. Id. at 33; 93 L.Ed. 1782, 1788.
57. 367 U.S. 643, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961).
58. Id. at 655; 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1090.
59. Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 57.
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the state courts. It should not be surprising, therefore, that
the Supreme Court reaffirmed Schwartz v. Texas in Pugach
v. Dollinger, et al.0
Petitioner Pugach was charged, in a New York state court,
with the commission of several serious crimes. He sought an
injunction in federal court against, inter alia, the district at-
torney of Bronx County, alleging that agents of the district
attorney had tapped his telephone pursuant to a state court
warrant and obtained information which the district attorney
had used before the grand jury and intended to use in the
pending trial. Pugach therefore asked that the defendant be
enjoined "from proceeding . .. upon the indictments . . .
on any grounds in which they may use wiretapping evidence,
or on any grounds or investigations resulting from or insti-
tuted as a result of the aforesaid illegal wire taps.' ' 61 The
lower federal courts denied relief.
62
The Supreme Court affirmed per curiam, "on the authority
of Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, and StefaneZli v. Minard,
342 U.S. 117." Mr. Justice Brennan "would also affirm but
solely on the authority of Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117"
- that is, solely as an exercise of equitable discretion.
63 It
would appear, therefore, that a majority of the Supreme Court
still regards Schwartz v. Texas as sound.6
4
Irvine v. California
In Irvine v. California65 local police officers honeycombed
defendant's home with an elaborate network of microphones
which they used to listen in on virtually every word spoken
within the house. Relying on the definition of interception
adopted in Goldman v. United States,66 the Supreme Court
concluded, inter alia, that section 605 was not applicable. The
Court said:
Here the apparatus of the officers was not in any way
connected with the telephone facilities, there was no inter-
60. 365 U.S. 458, 5 L.Ed.2d 678 (1959).
61. Id. at 461; 5 L.Ed.2d 678, 680.
62. Pugach v. Sullivan, 180 F.Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), stay granted
275 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1960), a!f'd 277 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1960). See also
Pugach v. Dollinger, 280 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1960).
63. 365 U.S. 458, 5 L.Ed.2d 678 (1959).
64. See also O'Rouke v. Levine, 181 F.Supp. 947 (E.D.N.Y. 1960),
cert. denied, O'Rouke v. New York, 362 U.S. 980, 4 L.Ed.2d 1015 (1960).
65. 347 U.S. 128, 98 L.Ed. 561 (1953).
66. 316 U.S. 129, 86 L.Ed. 1322 (1941).
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ference with the communications system, there was no
interception of any message. All that was heard through
the microphone was what an eavesdropper, hidden in the
hall, the bedroom, or the closet, might have heard. We
do not suppose it is illegal to testify to what another
person is heard to say merely because he is saying it into
a telephone. 67
The Push For Legislation
A determined effort was made in 1953-1954 to enact wire-
tap legislation. The House Judiciary Committee held hearings
on a number of bills concerning wiretapping. 68 Attorney Gen-
eral Brownell took the position that wiretapping by govern-
ment agents should be expressly authorized and that the con-
trol of such practices should be vested solely in the Attorney
General. When pressed to the extreme, however, the Depart-
ment of Justice expressed the view that legislation authorizing
wiretapping only on condition that it be controlled by judicial
procedures was preferable to no legislation at all. Deputy
Attorney General William P. Rogers was asked point blank
during the above hearings before the House Judiciary Com-
mittee :69
Mr. Keating: ... You feel the application to the court
would throw such a cumbersome burden upon the Attor-
ney General that you would rather not see any bill than
a bill with such provision?
Mr. Rogers: No; I do not, Mr. Chairman, I do not.
I mean if it comes down to a question of whether we can
have a bill passed and we have to get permission, cer-
tainly we would prefer that.
Subcommittee No. 3 favorably reported H. R. 477 to the
House Judiciary Committee. Congressman (now Senator)
Keating, the author of H. R. 477, proposed an amendment to
his original bill. This was adopted by the full committee and
ordered reported in the form of a clean bill, H. R. 8649.70 At
the same time, the Committee stated the case for authorized
interceptions in these terms:
67. 347 U.S. 128, 131, 98 L.Ed. 561, 568 (1953).
68. See Hearings before Subcommittee No. 8, House Committee on the
Judiciary, on H. R. 408, H. R. 477, H. R. 3552, H. R. 5149, 83rd Cong.,
1st Sess.
69. Id. at 38.
70. See H. R. REP. No. 1461, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., p. 1.
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The existence of an international conspiracy to destroy
our form of government is so notorious that it needs no
comment. The fact that the agents of this conspiracy are
dedicated solely to the overthrow of our Government by
force and violence and are engaged in the commission of
such crimes as espionage, sabotage, treason, and other
subversive crimes, is patent. The record of our courts
substantiate the accuracy of that statement...
Here are subversive zealots, dedicated to a cause hos-
tile to the very existence of our Government, who are
expertly trained to operate within the confines of our
country, in secrecy and stealth. They are equipped with
the latest technological equipment that science can devise
to further their work ...
Our Nation needs today, more than ever, every weapon
it can use to destroy those who seek to destroy it. The
immunity which the present law gives to these spies and
traitors in using a telephone conduit to carry out their
plans of intrigue and subversion must be stopped.7 1
As approved by the House of Representatives on April 8,
1954,72 H. R. 8649 authorized interception in cases affecting
the national security and defense and enumerated the offenses
deemed to fall in this category. It also provided that each
wiretapping installation had to be expressly approved by both
the Attorney General and an appropriate district court. The
court was authorized to permit such an installation only upon
an ex parte showing of reasonable cause.
73
When H. R. 8649 (together with other proposals) was con-
sidered by a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, Attorney General Brownell again sought to have
the authority to grant wiretap orders vested in the hands of
the Attorney General alone.
He argued strongly that by limiting this non-delegable
power to authorize wiretapping in his hands alone, the respon-
sibility for any abuse could easily be fixed, unauthorized leaks
of security information would be minimized, and the required
secrecy necessary to insure a successful wiretap would be
more apt to be maintained. In addition, he pointed out that
71. Id. at 4-5.
72. 100 CONG. Rnc. 4913-4914.
73. 100 CONG. REc. 4911-4912, see generally, 4890-4914.
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uniform criteria for the issuance of any wiretap order could
be established and easily followed, but, on the other hand, if
judicial authority was required to validate a wiretap order,
individual federal judges empowered to pass upon a wiretap
application would not be guided by any uniform standard in
granting or withholding approval. He was of the further
opinion that the court order procedure would be constitution-
ally questionable, contending that it was doubtful that Con-
gress could give a federal judge sitting in one judicial district
the authority to order a wiretap effective in another judicial
district.7 4 The effect which this statement had is problemat-
ical. What is certain is that H. R. 864 died in the Senate.
A new Congress, the 84th, saw new attempts at legislation
on the subject. By this time many of the congressional leaders
sitting on the committees that controlled the destiny of all
wiretap legislation were deeply committed to the type of pro-
cedure which should be followed if wiretapping was to be
allowed by statute. Congressman Celler, then as now the
Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Repre-
sentatives, had formerly championed the cause of the Attorney
General on wiretap proposals.7 5 By 1955, however, he was
firmly of the view that investigative agents ought not to be
permitted to intercept communications until after judicial
approval had been obtained. "I personally believe," said Con-
gressman Celler,
that all wiretapping must be declared unlawful and sub-
ject to severe penalties except in authorized cases like
treason.... In such cases wiretaps should be permitted
but then only after an order has been obtained from a
federal judge approving the tap. All other wiretaps shall
be declared unwarranted and illegal.7 6
Senator Keating, in 1955 a minority member on the House
Judiciary Committee who already had introduced several wire-
tapping measures, had adopted the same position. In speaking
of his own bill, 77 Senator Keating said:
74. Supra note 17, at 15-19.
75. See, i.e., 100 CONG. REc. 4912.
76. Hearings before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., on H. R. 762, H. R. 867, H. R. 4513,
H. R. 4728, H. R. 5096, p. 2. H. R. 762 and 867 were identical to H. R.
8649, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., discussed supra; while H. R. 5096 was similar
to H. R. 8649.
77. H. R. 5906, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
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[This bill requires] that as to the future it would be
necessary to go to a court and show that there was rea-
sonable cause to believe that one of the designated crimes
has been or is about to be committed and that the com-
munications may contain information which would assist
in the conduct of such investigations . .. [S]uch an ap-
proach is the only one likely to be successful in this
Congress.
78
Meanwhile Congressmen Willis and Forrester sponsored
H. R. 762'9, a bill which also required prior court authoriza-
tion of all interceptions.80 Congressman Walter, the second
ranking majority member of the Committee, had also intro-
duced wiretap measures requiring the court-order type of
procedure to give wiretapping authority to federal law en-
forcement officials. 8 '
In the Senate, the same approach was advocated by the late
Senator McCarran, former Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, and the ranking minority member at the time the
Committee held extensive hearings on his wiretap bill and
others during the second session of the 83rd Congress.
8 2
The action of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in
regard to S. 3760,83 is also significant in this connection. S.
376084 was one of the forerunners to the Narcotic Control Act
of 195685 since the bill which eventually became law86 was
passed, after conference, in lieu of the Senate bill.87 As re-
ported unanimously by the Committee on the Judiciary, S.
3760, inter acia, would have caused 18 U. S. C. 1407 to provide
78. Supra note 28 at 23.
79. 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
80. Id. at 17-18.
81. As long ago as 1941, Congressman Walter said (87 CONG. REC.5766) :I recognize that there are cases when it might be quite
helpful in the detection of the perpetrators of the heinous
offenses enumerated in this bill to tap wires. I have intro-
duced a bill that if it is ever necessary to tap a wire we
ought to compel the agent who intends to invade the privacy
of our lives to go before a representative of the courts and
make out a case of probable cause, demonstrating to the
court the necessity for invading the privacy of our lives.
82. See Senator McCarran's remarks at the time when he introduced
S. 3229, 100 CoNG. REC. 4156-4157.
83. 84th Cong., 2d Sess.
84. Id.
85. 70 Stat. 567.
86. H. R. 11619, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.
87. See 102 CONG. REC. 10807.
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that federal officers investigating narcotics offenses would be
authorized to intercept telephone communications and testify
in court to the contents of such communications if such offi-
cers obtained, before interception, a district court order
authorizing the interception. The district court was directed,
by the terms of the proposal, to issue the order allowing
interception only if it was shown that reasonable grounds
existed to believe that the contemplated interception was nec-
essary in the public interest to gather information of a viola-
tion of the narcotics laws. "The procedure to be followed in
order to obtain authorization to intercept telephone conver-
sations is similar to the procedure followed to procure a
search warrant."8 8 The Senate Committee on the Judiciary
in the 84th Congress, 2d Sess., numbered among its members
Senators James 0. Eastland, Estes Kefauver, Olin D. John-
ston, John J. McClellan, and Everett Dirksen. All of these
Senators are members of the Senate Judiciary at the present
time.
It was against this background that the Supreme Court
decided Benanti v. United States.8 9
Benanti v. United States
The State of New York, by constitutional provision and
statutory enactment, permits the interception of telephone
communications where law enforcement officials first obtain
a warrant authorizing the procedure.9 0 In 1956, the New York
City police, acting in full compliance with state law, inter-
cepted a telephone communication between Salvatore Benanti
and another person. What they heard gave them reason to
believe that the defendant intended to transport narcotics that
evening. When they arrested Benanti, however, they found
not the expected packages of narcotics, but instead a substan-
tial number of cans containing untaxed alcohol. A federal
prosecution for the illegal possession and transportation of
untaxed distilled spirits followed. A timely motion to sup-
press, based on the above facts, was denied and Benanti was
convicted.
The Supreme Court reversed. Pointing out that the Federal
Communications Act was "a comprehensive scheme for the
88. S. REP. No. 1997, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 14, see also pp. 31-32.
89. 355 U.S. 96, 2 L.Ed.2d 126 (1956).
90. N. Y. CONST., art. 1, §12; N.Y. CODE OF CnIM. P. §813-a.
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regulation of interstate communication" 91 which did not admit
of "state legislation which would contradict"92 either section
605 or its underlying policy, the Court held that "evidence
obtained by means forbidden by section 605, whether by state
or federal agents, is inadmissible in federal court."93 In short,
the Court not only reaffirmed the basic principles of the
second Nardone case,9 4 supra, it also branded all state laws
authorizing wiretapping, however circumscribed, as no more
than ineffectual state licenses to commit a federal crime.
Rathbun v. United States
It is rather interesting to note that both Benanti v. United
States and Rathbun90 were announced on the same decision
Monday, December 9, 1957. As we have seen, the former case
decided that the "silver platter" doctrine96 did not apply to
cases where section 605 had been violated, thus giving more
"bite" to its prohibitions. The latter decision, however, limited
the scope of the word "interception." In Rathbun, the de-
fendant had telephoned a former business associate and
threatened the latter's life. Anticipating further calls, the
associate summoned the local police, who listened at a tele-
phone extension when the defendant called a second time to
repeat in substance and embellish in detail his earlier threat.
The testimony of the local officers as to the content of this
long distance telephone call was introduced at defendant's
trial for the offense of transmitting a threat to do personal
harm in interstate commerce.
In its opinion, written by Chief Justice Warren, the Court
held that "Section 605 was not violated in the case before us
because there has been no 'interception' as Congress intended
the word to be used."97 "Common experience tells us," said
the Chief Justice:
that a call to a particular telephone number may cause
the bell to ring in more than one ordinarily used instru-
ment. Each party to a telephone conversation takes the
risk that the other party may have an extension tele-
91. 355 U.S. 96, 104,2 L.Ed.2d 126, 132 (1956).
92. Id. at 105; 2 L.Ed.2d 126, 133.
93. Id. at 100; 2 L.Ed.2d 126, 130.
94. 308 U.S. 338, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939).
95. 355 U.S. 107,2 L.Ed.2d 134 (1956).
96. See Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1948);
cf. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1958).
97. 355 U.S. 107, 109, 2 L.Ed.2d 134, 136 (1956).
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phone and may allow another to overhear the conversa-
tion. When such takes place there has been no violation
of any privacy of which the parties may complain. Con-
sequently, one element of Section 605, interception, has
not occurred.98
Reaction to the Benanti Decision
The decision in Benanti v. United States, supra, led to a
strong reaction from local officials in states such as New
York, which had authorized widetapping by statute. This re-
action was voiced at hearings on wiretapping, eavesdropping,
and the Bill of Rights conducted by the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary in both 1958 99 and 1959.100 The testimony of Mr.
Edward S. Silver, District Attorney, Kings County, New York,
before the subcommittee which actually conducted these hear-
ings, was typical of those who regarded the situation follow-
ing the Benanti decision as untenable. In his words:
I have this right [to wiretap under New York law] as
a trustee for 3 million people that I have to represent in
fighting crime. If for any reason, the Senate or the Cofi-
gress doesn't do something to correct the Benanti deci-
sion, we just will not be able to use wiretapping in our
law enforcement, and it simply means that a lot of people
who elected me to fight crime in our county. If I am com-
pelled to hunt lions with a peashooter, so be it. I think
the Congress has a serious responsibility in this matter, 101
and,10
2
The least that Congress should do is to amend section
605 of the Federal Communications Act to the effect that
it will not be unlawful for law enforcing agencies to tap
wires in states like New York which requires a court
order on a sworn statement of reasonableness. 0 3
Meanwhile, the Department of Justice adhered to its earlier
position that interception alone is not an offense. In a letter
98. Id. at 111; 2 L.Ed.2d 134, 137-138.
99. S. Res. 234, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
100. S. Res. 62, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
101. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86 Cong., 1st Sess., p. 540.
102. Id. at 549.
103. The local New York officials are still interested in persuading Con-
gress to act. In November, 1961, 98 gambling suspects were freed in
General Sessions Court, Brooklyn, New York, as a result of District At-
torney Hogan's decision not to attempt to use wiretap evidence to obtain
convictions in the future until authorized to intercept communications by
Congress. N. Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1961, p. 41, col. 1.
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dated July 2, 1959, and addressed to the Senate Judiciary
Committee, Attorney General Rogers stated that some 74
telephone taps were then being maintained "in cases involving
the internal security of the nation or where a human life may
be imperiled," and closed by noting that "there is, of course,
no divulgence of the information obtained as prescribed by
section 605 of the Communications Act."'10
Meanwhile, numerous bills to deal with one or all of the
aspects of wiretapping law were introduced. It is interesting
to note that, of all the wiretapping bills introduced in the
second session of the 85th Congress and the two sessions of
the 86th Congress,10 5 only H. R. 377 allowed the interception
of telephone communications in the absence of a court order.
All of the others either expressly required court approval of
any interception or were intended to legitimatize an existing
state procedure which vested control over wiretapping in the
state courts.
Silver v. United States
Ever ingenious in adapting modern methods to the process.
of crime detection, local District of Columbia police in this
instance used a microphone attached to a foot-long spike,
together with an amplifier, a power pack, and earphones, to,
listen to all that went on within the defendant's house. The
spike was inserted into a party wall until it made contact
with a heating duct within the house which in turn converted
the entire heating system into a conductor of sound. The
Supreme Court had no difficulty in disposing of the case on
Fourth Amendment grounds, having found as it did that the
"eavesdropping was accomplished by means of an unauthor-
ized physical penetration into the premises occupied by the
104. It is interesting to note that there was only one federal prosecu-
tion for violation of §605 during the first 20 years after its enactment -
perhaps due to the fact that alleged violations were investigated by the
Federal Communications Commission rather than by agencies more ori-
ented toward criminal investigations (100 CONG. REc. 4801, 4803). In
more recent times, however, it has been the policy to push prosecutions7
for violations of §605 more vigorously. See, i.e., Elkins v. U. S., 364 U.S.
206, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1958); Massicot v. U. S., 254 F.2d 58 (5th Cir
1958); cert, denied 358 U.S. 816, 3 L.Ed.2d 58 (1958); U. S. v. Gris, 247
F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 1957) ; Massengale v. United States, 240 F.2d 781 (6th
Cir. 1957), cart. denied 354 U.S. 909, 1 L.Ed.2d 1428 (1957). Assistant
Attorney General Miller recently stated that there has been a total of
15 such prosecutions. Washington Post, May 12, 1961, p. Al, col. 2-5.
105. S. 3013, H. R. 104, H. R. 12394, H. R. 12393, H. R. 13842, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess.; H. R. 377, H. R. 70, S. 1292, H. R. 11589, S. 3340, 86th.
Cong.
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petitioners."'10 6 The Court also held, however, that section
605 was not applicable. "While it is true that much of what
the officers heard consisted of the petitioners' share of tele-
phone conversations, we cannot say that the officers inter-
cepted these conversations, within the meaning of the
statute."'107 Thus, it may be said that Silvermzn' 0 8 is cut from
the same cloth asGoldman and Ir-ine -. California. In all three
cases, the Court found that there was no prohibited intercep-
tion. In each case, the determinative issue was whether or
not there was a physical intrusion.
CURRENT LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
Four bills, S. 1086, S. 1221, S. 1495, and S. 2813 have been
introduced in the 87th Congress on the Senate side regarding
wiretapping and the closely related problem of electronic de-
vices which may be used for eavesdropping. S. 1086, intro-
duced by Senator Keating, of New York, would permit state
law enforcement officials to wiretap pursuant to court orders
if state legislation authorizes the practice. The bill thus would
strike directly at Benanti v. United States. S. 1221, also in-
troduced by Senator Keating, would treat wiretapping as
part of the larger problem of eavesdropping through the use
of electronic instruments. S. 1495,, introduced by Senator
Dodd of Connecticut, would permit wiretapping by both state
and federal officers under court orders in certain cases.1 9
As introduced, S. 1086 provides that "no law of the United
States shall be construed to prohibit the interception, by any
law enforcement officer or agency of any state (or any polit-
ical subdivision thereof) in compliance with the provisions of
any statute of such state, of any wire or radio communication,
... [where state law establishes a judicial procedure for de-
termining before interception probable cause to believe that
106. 365 U.S. 505, 509, 5 L.Ed.2d 734, 738 (1959).
107. Id. at 508; 5 L.Ed.2d 734, 737.
108. Silverman v. U. S., 365 U.S. 505, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1959).
109. Hearings were held on these statutory proposals by the Subcom-
mittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
during the first session of the 87th Congress. Assistant Attorney General
Miller, speaking for the Department of Justice, disclosed that the F. B. I.
was operating 85 wiretaps as of May 10, 1961 - all involving national
security cases. Mr. Miller endorsed legislation which would empower the
Attorney General to authorize wiretaps without court order in national
security and kidnaping cases. He also proposed that federal agents be
authorized to wiretap after obtaining a court order when investigating
such crimes as murder, extortion, bribery, gambling, and dealing in nar-
cotics. Washington Post, May 12, 1961, p. Al, col. 2-5.
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interception might disclose evidence of the commission of a
crime.]" Second the bill provides that no law of the United
States shall be construed to prohibit divulgence in a state
court proceeding of the existence, contents, substance, pur-
port, effect, or meaning of any communication intercepted in
accordance with a state law which meets the standard set
forth above.
S. 2813, which was drafted by the Department of Justice
and introduced by Senators McClellan, Eastland, and Ervin,
is a more comprehensive measure. It would outlaw all private
wiretapping and all wiretapping by law enforcement officials
which does not conform to the authority granted by the bill.
As drafted, the proposal forbids the interception of a wire
communication or the divulgence or the use of the intercepted
information. The procedure contemplated by the bill may be
summarized as follows:
1. In federal cases involving offenses affecting the national
security-espionage, sabotage, treason, sedition, subversive
activities, and unauthorized disclosure of Atomic Energy in-
formation-the Attorney General:
(a) may authorize the F.B.I. to wiretap if he finds
that there is reasonable ground to believe, inter alia, that
the commission of the offense presents a serious threat to
the security of the United States and that resort to the
court procedure discussed infra, (b), would be prejudicial
to the national interest; or
(b) may authorize an application to a federal judge
for an order, granted ex parte and on a showing of prob-
able cause, allowing wiretapping by the F.B.I. or by any
federal agency having investigative responsibility for the
crimes named above. Leave to intercept wire communi-
cations granted under this procedure, or under 2 and 3
infra, would be effective for any period not to exceed 45
days. Permission to wiretap might be extended for
periods of not more than 20 days upon further
application.
2. In federal cases involving murder, kidnaping, bribery,
transmission of gambling information, travel in aid of racke-
teering enterprises, offenses against the narcotics laws, and
conspiracy to commit the foregoing, the Attorney General or
Assistant Attorney General may authorize the F.B.I. or any
Vol. 15
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federal agency having investigative responsibility for the
foregoing crimes to apply to a federal judge for an order,
* granted under the conditions set out in 1 (b) upra, allowing
wiretapping.
3. In state cases, the attorney general of the state or the
principal prosecuting attorney for any political subdivision
thereof, if authorized to do so by state law, may apply to a
state judge for leave to wiretap for the crimes of murder,
kidnaping, extortion, bribery, use or dealing in narcotics, and
conspiracy involving these crimes. The state judge would be
governed by. the same criteria as would federal judges in
passing on the application.
An important feature of this bill is found in section 6,
which would permit persons who had made lawful intercep-
tions to divulge and use the information so obtained. More-
over, testimony regarding information so obtained would be
admissible in federal or state criminal trials or grand jury
proceedings.
Copies of all the applications made the orders issued under
the procedures specified in this bill would be transmitted by
both state and federal judges to the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts and the Department of Justice. In
March of each year the Director of the Administrative Office
would transmit to the Congress a full and complete report
concerning the number of applications made, granted, and
denied during the preceding calendar year.
CONCLUSION
Several conclusions may be drawn in summary fashion
from an evaluation of the study. The underlying conclusion,
with strong support from both sides of the dispute, is that
there is a pressing need for Congress to legislate in this
field.1 10 The opponents of wiretapping, of course, want Con-
gress to prohibit altogether the practice, while its advocates
want wiretapping, but under various safeguards.
110. Action by Congress to authorize the use of the fruits of wiretap
ping as evidence would not appear to create any ex post facto problems.
There is no vested right in this kind of rule of evidence, and Congress
may apply new rules to pending cases. Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S.
380, 43 L.Ed 204 (1898); Landay v. U. S., 108 F.2d 698 (6th Cir. 1939),
cert. denied 309 U.S. 681, 84 L.Ed. 1024 (1940); Haas v. U. S., 93 F.2d
427 (8th Cir. 1938).
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Those law enforcement officials who seek authority to wire-
tap state their case in the following manner:
1. Since wiretapping does not violate a citizen's constitu-
tional rights, the present prohibition essentially is nothing
more than an unreasonable rule of evidence in federal crim-
inal procedure. It does not stop people from tapping wires-'
no one has ever been or under present law would be convicted
of that by itself. What has been stopped is the use of certain
evidence to enforce the laws against criminals.
2. Criminals and individuals who have been skillfully
trained in the ways of espionage, sabotage and subversive
activities employ the most modern scientific devices for com-
munication and eavesdropping. In contrast, law enforcement
officials are denied the use of these identical facilities in their'
efforts to maintain a successful campaign against these
elements.
3. Wiretapping in criminal cases is no more reprehensible
or morally repugnant than the sanctioned use by the courts of
the testimony of eavesdroppers, informers, stool pigeons, and
spies.
4. By channeling all wiretap activities into the hands of a
relatively few federal and state law enforcement officials,
unauthorized wiretapping would be minimized, and only those
individuals who are engaged in criminal or subversive activi-
ties would have to fear any invasion of their privacy.
The opponents of wiretapping, on the other hand, argue as
follows:
1. Wiretapping is an unwarranted invasion of an individ-
ual's privacy not justfied by the end desired in the field of law
enforcement.
2. Wiretapping can never be effectively controlled by stat-
ute since the activity itself necessarily involves the
interception of innocuous as well as incriminating conversa-
tions.
3. Because of the complexity of the telephone communica-
tion network, not only the -conversations of a suspected
criminal but also those of innocent persons would necessarily
be intercepted.
620 [Vol. 1,5
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4. Abuses of statutory authority to tap wires, and other
unauthorized activities of this nature, would be difficult to
detect since the victim would be unaware of an unlawful
interception of his conversation unless he was charged with
crime and brought to trial. Even then, he would have no
judicial remedy available to suppress such activity.
5. Information not pertinent to a criminal investigation
procured through wiretapping could be used for blackmail,
extortion, the oppression of persons having unpopular views,
for political purposes, or for the benefit of individuals who
employ former government agents after they leave federal
service.
Federal case law as declared by the Supreme Court:
1. Wiretapping, absent any physical intrusion into a pro-
tected area, does not violate the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution proscribing unreasonable search and seizures,
nor does it violate the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution
which affords protection against self-incrimination.
2. Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act forbids
federal law enforcement officials from testifying to the con-
tents of intercepted communications in any federal criminal
case.
3. Any evidence which is a product or the derivative re-
sult of a wiretap is inadmissible in any federal criminal
proceedings.
4. Intercepted intrastate communications fall within the
prohibition of Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act.
5. The use of detectophones and other eavesdropping de-
vices is not an interception within the meaning of that term as
used in Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act.
6. A third person not the victim of an intercepted com-
munication has no legal standing to challenge its admissibility
as evidence when it is used against him in a federal criminal
proceeding.
7. Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act does not
constitute a binding rule of evidence upon state courts so as to
exclude such evidence in state proceedings.
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8. The use of an extension telephone to listen in on a tele-
phone conversation, with the consent of one party to the
conversation, is not an "interception" of the message within
the meaning of Section 605.
9. Wiretapping by state officers seeking to enforce state
law is not exempted from the operation of Section 605, even
though state law purports to authorize the interception. Evi-
dence so obtained is not admissible in a federal criminal
prosecution, and the use of such evidence in state prosecutions
involves the commission of a federal crime.
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